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Many regulated industries have a vertically integrated dominant incumbent who produces critical inputs
that could potentially be used by entrants to compete with the incumbent in downstream markets. Al-
ternatively, entrants could produce the critical inputs and thereby bypass the incumbent’s facilities. This
structure is quite explicit in US telecommunications, where rival suppliers of long distance and other ser-
vices often use the local switching and transmission facilities of the incumbent to deliver those services, and
the incumbent is required by regulation to lease these critical inputs to rivals,1 but entrants can and do
sometimes install their own local switching and/or transmission facilities.2 A similar structure arises in gas
and electric distribution and railroad trackage rights, as well as in antitrust analysis of some unregulated
industries.3
One central issue in these contexts is how the policy-maker should set the price of the dominant in-
cumbent’s critical input(s) to induce productively eﬃcient make-or-buy decisions by entrants.4 The critical
input in many network industries is access to the network, and access price regulation is a contentious and
high-stakes undertaking.5 Although it is well-established theoretically that pricing access at marginal cost
is not socially optimal in general,6 marginal cost pricing has many merits and has become quite common
in practice.7 One argument oﬀered in favor of marginal cost pricing is that an input price set equal to the
incumbent’s cost will cause the entrant to make its own inputs when its cost is below the incumbent’s cost,
and buy the input from the incumbent when its cost is above the incumbent’s cost.8 However, Sappington
(2005) shows that input prices may have no eﬀect on entrants’ make-or-buy decisions once the strategic ef-
fect of make-or-buy decisions on subsequent retail competition is properly considered. Indeed, the literature
1Section 251(c) of The Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires that incumbent local exchange carriers lease unbundled
network elements to and interconnect with competing local exchange carriers.
2The US Federal Communications Commission (2006, Table 3) reports that 32% of the 32.6 million switched access lines
sold by CLECs (competitive local exchange carriers, i.e., providers of local telephone service who were not the incumbent when
the markets were opened to competition) in December 2005 were owned by the CLEC; the other 68% were sold under a lease
or resale arrangement with the incumbent.
3Armstrong, Doyle, and Vickers (1996) p. 131.
4Vogelsang (2003) p. 844 notes that “... the price regulation of one-way access appears to be an indispensable policy
instrument [that] ... is directed ... at productive eﬃciency.”
5Laﬀont and Tirole (2000) p. 6.
6Laﬀont and Tirole (1994).
7Vogelsang (2003) pp. 837-8.
8See Armstrong (2001) p. 300 and Vogelsang (2003) pp. 840-841. This logic is partly responsible for the US Federal
Communications Commission’s (FCC) adoption of the Coalition for Aﬀordable Local and Long Distance Service proposal on
May 31, 2000, which moved local network access charges rapidly toward the marginal cost of supplying access in the US
telecommunications industry (FCC, 2000). Paragraph 114 of this order states, in part: “Prices that are below cost reduce the
incentives for entry by ﬁrms that could provide the services as eﬃciently, or more eﬃciently, than the incumbent LEC [Local
Exchange Carrier]. Similarly, discrepancies between price and cost may create incentives for carriers to enter low-cost areas
even if their cost of providing service is actually higher than that of the incumbent LEC. These ﬁndings and conclusions clearly
support the proposed limited deaveraging of SLCs [Subscriber Line Charges].”
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on bypass either does not consider the eﬀect of make-or-buy decisions on subsequent retail competition, or
formally considers the eﬀect only on narrow forms of retail competition.9
The present paper considers eﬃciency of an entrant’s make-or-buy decision in a relatively general model of
retail price competition with diﬀerentiated products. Diﬀerentiated products price competition is considered
the most relevant setting by many observers.10 A primary objective is to investigate the generality of
Sappington’s (2005) “irrelevance” result. We derive a condition on the demand and cost structures, and the
policy-maker’s pricing rule, that is necessary and suﬃcient for eﬃcient make-or-buy decisions. This condition
clariﬁes that the input price is irrelevant for make-or-buy decisions only under restrictive assumptions about
demand that would be diﬃcult to verify in practice. Laﬀont and Tirole’s (2000, chapter 4) admonishment to
minimize reliance on detailed cost and demand information therefore argues for input pricing policies that
do not attempt to establish whether the irrelevance assumptions hold. Instead, industrial policy is more
reliably based on less informationally-demanding input pricing rules that still induce eﬃcient make-or-buy
decisions. Our necessary and suﬃcient condition is then exploited to show formally that marginal cost
pricing of the incumbent’s critical input indeed ensures eﬃcient make-or-buy decisions, and that marginal
cost pricing is the only continuous input pricing rule that accomplishes this objective without relying on
cost information about the entrant or general demand information. An example shows, however, that there
may be considerable latitude for policy-makers to depart from marginal cost pricing and still obtain eﬃcient
make-or-buy decisions when there are diﬀerences in productive eﬃciency and products are close substitutes.
I. The Model
The standard input pricing model envisions a vertically integrated dominant incumbent who produces
a critical upstream input that is required in ﬁxed proportion (normalized to one) to produce the retail
9Armstrong, Doyle, and Vickers’ (1996) extensive analysis of bypass assumes a price-taking competitive fringe, and they
note (p. 149) that “... the nature of competition in the ﬁnal product market – and therefore allocative eﬃciency – could well
be inﬂuenced by the access pricing regime.” Armstrong (2001) does not explicitly consider competition in the retail market
(the incumbent’s retail price is exogenous). Armstrong’s (2002, section 2) discussion of one-way access considers the same
forms of retail competition as Armstrong, Doyle, and Vickers (1996) and Armstrong (2001). Laﬀont and Tirole’s (1994)
seminal study of access pricing does not consider a model of strategic downstream interaction between the incumbent and
entrant. Sappington (2005) assumes Hotelling competition. Gayle and Weisman (2006) examine both vertical diﬀerentiation
and Cournot competition.
10See, for example, Armstrong (2002); Blank, Kaserman, and Mayo (1998); Gayle and Weisman (2006); Sappington (2005);
and Weisman (1995). Although the ﬁrst two of these papers consider a competitive fringe rather than simultaneous noncoop-
erative price-setting, Armstrong (p. 303) is explicit that the price-taking fringe is an assumption of convenience “... to sidestep
the issue of market power of entrants ...”.
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(downstream) output. An entrant produces a diﬀerentiated retail product and competes via simultaneous
noncooperative price competition against the incumbent. Before the price competition, the entrant chooses
whether to make its own critical input or buy the critical input from the dominant incumbent at a preset
(most likely by regulation) input price w.
Denote (retail) prices, quantities, costs, and proﬁts by p, Q, C, and Π, respectively. These symbols carry
superscripts I and E as needed to denote the incumbent and entrant, respectively, and subscripts u and d to
denote upstream and downstream. Numerical subscripts denote partial derivatives. Fixed proportions for the
critical upstream input means upstream and downstream costs are additively separable, with Cid(·) the (twice
diﬀerentiable) downstream cost function for ﬁrm i = I, E and ciu that ﬁrm’s constant upstream marginal cost.
The (twice diﬀerentiable) retail demand functions are QI(pI , pE) and QE(pE , pI). A maintained assumption
is that demands have the standard gross substitutes property.
Assumption GS. −Qi1 > Qi2 > 0 when Qi is positive, for i = I, E.11
The proﬁt objectives for the downstream price competition are:
max
{pI}
ΠI(pI ; pE , w) =
[
pI − cIu
]
QI(pI , pE)− CId(QI(pI , pE)) +
[
w − cIu
]
QE(pE , pI) (Π-I)
max
{pE}
ΠE(pE ; pI , cEu ) =
[
pE − cEu
]
QE(pE , pI)− CEd (QE(pE , pI)). (Π-E)
The parameters w and cEu are of primary interest and are therefore included in the notation. A decision by
the entrant to make the input is modeled by setting w equal to cIu (thereby eliminating the last term from
ΠI) and a decision to buy the input from the incumbent is modeled by setting cEu equal to w.
A second maintained assumption is that the model has the standard strategic complements structure.
Assumption SC. Πi12 > 0 for i = I, E.
12
The price-setting game is supermodular under assumptions GS and SC, which ensures existence (but not
uniqueness) of Nash equilibrium (Vives 1999, pp. 151-2). As in the extant models, we focus on interior
11Vives (1999) p. 144.
12Bulow et al. (1985). The derivatives are ΠI12 = Q
I
2 +
[
pI − cIu − CI
′
d
]
QI12 − CI
′′
d Q
I
1Q
I
2 +
[
w − cIu
]
QE12 and Π
E
12 =
QE2 +
[
pE − cEu − CE
′
d
]
QE12 − CE
′′
d Q
E
1 Q
E
2 , so suﬃcient conditions for Π
i
12 > 0 for i = I, E are that downstream costs are
convex and the inverse demand facing each competitor becomes steeper as its rival’s price increases (i.e., Qi12 > 0 for i = I, E),
provided the price-cost margins are non-negative.
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equilibria. Denoting equilibrium values with a circumﬂex, interior equilibrium prices pˆi(cEu , w) for i = I, E
must satisfy the ﬁrst order conditions
ΠI1 = Q
I(pˆI , pˆE) +
[
pˆI − cIu −CI
′
d (Q
I(pˆI , pˆE))
]
QI1(pˆ
I , pˆE) +
[
w − cIu
]
QE2 (pˆ
E , pˆI) = 0
(FoC-I)
ΠE1 = Q
E(pˆE , pˆI) +
[
pˆE − cEu −CE
′
d (Q
E(pˆE , pˆI))
]
QE1 (pˆ
E , pˆI) = 0.
(FoC-E)
Equilibrium proﬁts are then
Π̂I(cEu , w) = Π
I(pˆI(cEu , w); pˆ
E(cEu , w), w) (Π̂-I)
Π̂E(cEu , w) = Π
E(pˆE(cEu , w); pˆ
I(cEu , w), c
E
u ). (Π̂-E)
A third maintained assumption is that the entrant’s equilibrium proﬁt is a continuous function.
Assumption C. Π̂E(cEu , w) is a continuous function.13
Equilibrium proﬁts following a “Make” decision are Π̂i(cEu , cIu) and equilibrium proﬁts following a “Buy”
decision are Π̂i(w,w), for i = I, E. So the entrant chooses Make over Buy if and only if
Π̂E(cEu , c
I
u) > Π̂
E(w,w). (MoB)
II. Comparative Statics
As the price-setting game is supermodular, if increases in the input price w or the entrant’s upstream
cost cEu systematically increase both ﬁrms’ incremental returns from raising their prices then higher levels
of these parameters correspond to higher equilibrium prices for both the incumbent and entrant.14 ΠI does
not depend directly on cEu , and ΠE does not depend directly on w, so the cross-partial derivatives that must
be examined to determine whether each ﬁrm has increasing incremental returns are:
ΠI13 = Q
E
2 and Π
E
13 = −QE1 . (1)
Assumption GS ensures both derivatives in (1) are positive, so supermodularity yields:
13This is not immediately implied by the Maximum Theorem because it involves changes in the rival’s choice when a
parameter changes. It holds, however, for standard functional forms of demands and costs.
14Milgrom and Roberts 1990; Topkis 1995; Vives 1999, p. 35. The monotonicity conclusion applies to the extremal equilibria
if there is not a unique equilibrium. Strictly speaking, SC must hold on compact strategy spaces that do not depend on the
comparative static parameters w and cEu . Little is lost by assuming existence of prices (p¯
I , p¯E) above which both demands are
zero, thereby providing upper bounds for the strategy spaces. Lower bounds are more problematic because Ci
′
d varies with the
prices, and cEu and w are comparative static parameters of interest, so a price-cost margin may be negative on parts of any
strategy spaces that might be stated in terms of lower bounds on prices. If so, then Qi12 > 0 and convex costs are not suﬃcient
for SC globally. However, both upstream price-cost margins are strictly positive at an interior equilibrium, so the problem can
be handled by stating a bound slightly below the equilibrium price and considering local comparative statics.
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Lemma 1. pˆi(cEu , w) is increasing in both of its arguments for i = I, E.
The comparative statics of Π̂E(cEu , w) are central in determining when (MoB) holds. Supermodularity
does not generally determine the comparative statics of equilibrium payoﬀs. However, Dixit (1986, pp. 112-
5) shows that cEu has an ambiguous eﬀect on Π̂
E because the direct and strategic eﬀects work in opposite
directions. Dixit’s analysis is not directly applicable for determining the eﬀect of w on Π̂E because the
functional form of ΠI does not ﬁt within Dixit’s framework.15 Direct evaluation of the derivatives, via the
envelope theorem, yields
Π̂E1 (c
E
u , w) = Π
E
2 pˆ
I
1 +Π
E
3 =
[
pˆE − cEu − CE
′
d (Q
E(pˆE , pˆI))
]
QE2 (pˆ
E , pˆI)pˆI1 −QE(pˆE , pˆI) (2a)
Π̂E2 (c
E
u , w) = Π
E
2 pˆ
I
2 =
[
pˆE − cEu − CE
′
d (Q
E(pˆE , pˆI))
]
QE2 (pˆ
E , pˆI)pˆI2 > 0. (2b)
(FOC-E) ensures that E’s price-cost margin is positive at an interior equilibrium. This, along with Assump-
tion GS and Lemma 1, establishes that the strategic eﬀects
[
pˆE − cEu −CE
′
d (Q
E(pˆE , pˆI))
]
QE2 (pˆE , pˆI)pˆIi for
i = 1, 2 in equations (2) are positive. The positive strategic eﬀect of w establishes Π̂E2 > 0, but the direct
eﬀect −QE(pˆE , pˆI) of cEu in (2a) is negative, conﬁrming Dixit’s ambiguous sign for Π̂E1 .
III. Efficient Make-or-Buy Decisions
The standard concept of an eﬃcient Make-or-Buy decision is that the entrant chooses to make the input
if and only if the entrant has lower upstream costs.16 There are two ways for a policy-maker to implement
this concept. First, a policy-maker could consider a cost pair (cEu , c
I
u) and ask: “Given these costs, for what
values of w will (MoB) hold and for what values of w will (MoB) fail?” Second, a policy-maker could more
generally ask: “What input pricing rule(s) w(cIu, cEu ), that map a cost pair into an input price, will ensure
that (MoB) holds if and only cEu < c
I
u?”
Gayle and Weisman (2006), and also Sappington’s (2005, p. 1636) discussion of “partial displacement,”
take the ﬁrst approach. This approach is information-intensive. It requires regulatory knowledge of both
the incumbent’s and the entrant’s upstream marginal costs, and demand information as well so that proﬁts
can be calculated. Policy-makers struggle to obtain reliable cost information about incumbents. Accurate
15Speciﬁcally, the upstream proﬁt term
[
w − cIu
]
QE(pE, pI) is not present in Dixit’s model.
16See Sappington (2005) p. 1633 and the references cited in footnote 8 above.
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cost or demand information about entrants is rarely available. Indeed, Laﬀont and Tirole (2000, chapter
4) pointedly argue for regulation that minimizes use of detailed demand and cost information because such
information is rarely available in usable form.
The second approach poses an interesting mechanism design question. The answer provides general advice
to policy-makers about how input pricing policy should be structured if the objective is to induce eﬃcient
Make-or-Buy decisions. At ﬁrst, it might appear that designing the right mechanism would require at least
as much information as choosing the right input price for a particular cost pair. Proposition 1, which is the
main result of the paper, shows that this need not be the case.
Proposition 1. Let φ(x) = Π̂E(x, x) denote the entrant’s equilibrium proﬁt when the entrant’s upstream
marginal cost and the incumbent’s input price are both x. Within the class of continuous input pricing rules,
(MoB) is equivalent to cEu < c
I
u if and only if the input pricing rule w(cIu, cEu ) satisﬁes φ(x) = φ(w(x, x)) for
every relevant identical cost level x.
Proof. Begin by assuming (MoB) is equivalent to cEu < cIu. One possible upstream cost conﬁguration is
equal productive eﬃciency: cIu = c
E
u = x. Equivalence of (MoB) and c
E
u < c
I
u for this cost conﬁguration
implies φ(x) = Π̂E(cEu , cIu) > φ(w(x, x)). Moreover, this inequality cannot be strict. If the inequality were
strict then continuity of Π̂E and w yields Π̂E(x, x− ε) > φ(w(x, x− ε)) for suﬃciently small ε > 0, in which
case the cost conﬁguration (cEu , cIu) = (x, x− ε) satisﬁes (MoB) yet has cEu > cIu. Therefore eﬃciency of the
Make-or-Buy decision implies φ(x) = φ(w(x, x)) for every possible common upstream cost x.
Now consider the converse. If cEu > cIu then Π̂E(cEu , cIu) < Π̂E(cEu , cEu ) = φ(cEu ) = φ(w(cEu , cEu )), using
(2b). If cEu < c
I
u then Π̂
E(cEu , c
I
u) > Π̂
E(cEu , c
E
u ) = φ(c
E
u ) = φ(w(c
E
u , c
E
u )). Hence c
E
u < c
I
u is equivalent to
(MoB). 
There are two ways to ensure φ(x) = φ(w(x, x)) across a range of x values. First, φ could be a constant
function. In this case the condition φ(x) = φ(w(x, x)) is uninformative about the input pricing rule. Indeed,
if φ is a constant function then any pricing rule satisﬁes φ(x) = φ(w(x, x)), so Make-or-Buy decisions will
be eﬃcient under any pricing rule. Input prices are irrelevant for the eﬃciency of Make-or-Buy decisions in
this situation.17 Note that φ′(x) = Π̂E1 (x, x) + Π̂E2 (x, x). Using (FoC-E) to substitute for QE in (2a), using
17It is shown below that Sappington’s (2005) Hotelling model has a constant φ function.
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(2b), and noting again that E’s equilibrium price-cost margin is positive, yields
φ′(x) s= QE1 (pˆ
E , pˆI) +QE2 (pˆ
E , pˆI)
[
pˆI1 + pˆ
I
2
]
, (3)
where pˆi is evaluated at (x, x) for i = I, E. As might be expected from equations (2), this expression has
ambiguous sign in general. φ is constant if and only if
1. The direct eﬀect dominates the strategic eﬀect in Π̂E1 , making the entrant’s equilibrium proﬁt decreasing
in its own cost, and
2. The magnitude of the negative eﬀect in item 1 is exactly oﬀset by the strategic eﬀect on Π̂E of a change
in w (i.e., Π̂E2 ).
Verifying these items generally requires a lot of information about the entrant’s equilibrium proﬁt function.
It is shown in the next section that one key determinant is the displacement ratio18 −QE2
QI1
, which measures
the fraction of incumbent demand increase that displaces entrant demand when the incumbent lowers its
retail price. However, the discussion below reveals that items 1 and 2 are determined exclusively by the
magnitude of the displacement ratio only under strong assumptions about industry demand that would be
diﬃcult for a policy-maker to verify in practice.
The second way to ensure φ(x) = φ(w(x, x)) is for the pricing rule to satisfy x = w(x, x). One such rule
is the marginal cost pricing rule w = cIu.
Corollary 1. Marginal cost pricing of the incumbent’s input induces eﬃcient Make-or-Buy decisions.
Proof. Marginal cost pricing is w(cIu, cEu ) = cIu. So w(x, x) = x. Now apply Proposition 1. 
Proposition 1 reveals, however, that there are many other continuous pricing rules that induce eﬃcient Make-
or-Buy decisions. For example, w(cIu, cEu ) = cIu + f(cIu − cEu ) satisﬁes the necessary and suﬃcient condition
for eﬃcient Make-or-Buy decisions for any continuous function f with a ﬁxed point at zero. Of course, all
such rules, except marginal cost pricing, require that the input price depend on the entrant’s upstream cost.
Corollary 2. Marginal cost pricing of the incumbent’s input is the only continuous input pricing rule that
guarantees eﬃcient Make-or-Buy decisions and does not require knowledge of the entrant’s upstream cost or
of the demand functions.
18Armstrong et al. 1996; Armstrong 2002; Sappington 2005 p. 1636.
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Proof. Proposition 1 requires w(x, x) = x or φ′(x) = 0. Conﬁrming the latter requires that items 1 and 2
above be conﬁrmed, which requires demand information. So consider an input pricing rule that satisﬁes the
former and does not depend on cEu . As the rule does not depend on cEu , a change in the second argument
with no change in the ﬁrst argument does not change w. Hence w(x, cEu ) = x for every possible incumbent
upstream cost x. 
Marginal cost pricing is much less informationally demanding than other possible eﬃciency-inducing rules.
Policy-makers must know only the incumbent’s upstream cost. No demand information, downstream cost
information, or information about the entrant are needed.
IV. Linear Demands
Two recent papers that have considered the eﬃciency of Make-or-Buy decisions are Sappington (2005) and
Gayle and Weisman (2006). Both papers use models of the form considered above with linear demands.19
Sappington assumes demands of the Hotelling form
Qi =
N
[
t+ pj − pi]
2t
for i, j = I, E (i = j), (Hot)
where N is the number of consumers in the linear city and t is the linear transport cost per unit of distance.
Gayle and Weisman assume demands of the vertical diﬀerentiation form
QI = 1− p
I − pE
λI − λE and Q
E =
pI
λI − λE −
λIpE
λE(λI − λE) , (VD)
where λI > λE are the quality parameters of the two ﬁrms.
It is straightforward to conﬁrm that, when demands are linear, Assumption GS implies
1. Πi12 = Qi2 > 0 for i = I, E (i.e., Assumption SC),
2. Πi11 = 2Qi1 < 0 for i = I, E (i.e., second order conditions), and
3. J = ΠI11ΠE11 − ΠI12ΠE12 = 4QI1QE1 −QI2QE2 > 0 (i.e., “stability”).
Moreover, standard comparative statics analysis yields
pˆI1 = −
QE1 Q
E
2
J
and pˆI2 = −
2QE1 Q
E
2
J
. (4)
19Gayle and Weisman consider a Cournot model as well.
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Substituting (4) into (3) and simplifying yields
φ′ s= − [QI1QE1 −QI2QE2 ] − [QI1QE1 − (QE2 )2] . (3-L)
The ﬁrst bracketed term in (3-L) is positive but approaches zero as the own-price and rival-price eﬀects on
demand become arbitrarily close in magnitude, and therefore cannot be relied upon in general to determine
the sign of (3-L). The second bracketed term has ambiguous sign because it involves the magnitude of the
own-price eﬀect on ﬁrm I’s demand relative to the rival-price eﬀect on ﬁrm E’s demand. This relative
magnitude is the displacement ratio and its size is not addressed by Assumption GS since it is a comparison
across incumbent and entrant demands.20 Hence (3) has ambiguous sign even in the linear case and φ need
not be constant when demands are linear. Indeed, (3-L) shows that φ′ is negative when own-price and
rival-price demand eﬀects are not too close and own-price eﬀects are generally larger in magnitude than
rival-price eﬀects.
Suppose, in particular, that the linear demands are symmetric. Letting Q(own price, rival price) denote
a common linear demand that satisﬁes Assumption GS, (3-L) becomes
φ′ s= −2 [(Q1)2 − (Q2)2] . (3-LS)
Equation (3-LS) is negative under Assumption GS but degenerates to zero as rival-price eﬀects approach
own-price eﬀects in magnitude (i.e., as Q2 approaches −Q1, or the displacement ratio approaches 1). The
Hotelling demands above are symmetric and are the limiting case of GS in which Q2 = −Q1. Hence φ′ = 0
in a standard Hotelling model, which gives Sappington’s (2005, p. 1636) “full displacement” explanation
of irrelevance of input prices for the eﬃciency of Make-or-Buy decisions as an application of Proposition 1.
Note, however, that this is a limiting case even when demands are linear and symmetric, and it implies a zero
aggregate price elasticity of demand. Input prices are relevant for the eﬃciency of Make-or-Buy decisions
in any linear symmetric demand structure that has own-price eﬀects larger in magnitude than rival-price
eﬀects.
Gayle and Weisman’s (2006) vertical diﬀerentiation model has linear but asymmetric demands. Diﬀeren-
20Indeed, Assumption GS does not ensure the “displacement” ratio is less than one, even when demands are linear, unless
the demands are symmetric.
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tiating (VD) and substituting into (3-L) yields
φ′ s= − 2
λE(λI − λE) < 0.
Hence φ is strictly decreasing in this model, which gives Gayle and Weisman’s conclusion that the input
pricing rule aﬀects eﬃciency of Make-or-Buy decisions as an application of Proposition 1.
If φ′(x) < 0, as suggested by the case of linear symmetric demands and by Gayle and Weisman’s model,
then the extent to which the input price can deviate from marginal cost while maintaining an eﬃcient Make-
or-Buy decision is depicted in Figure 1. If cEu exceeds cIu, as shown, then (2b) yields Π̂E(cEu , cIu) < Π̂E(cEu , cEu ),
also as shown. Π̂E(cEu , c
I
u) determines a critical input price, w
∗, at which (MoB) is an equality. Any input
price below this critical value will induce an eﬃcient Make-or-Buy decision. Similarly, if the entrant’s
upstream cost lies below cIu, shown as c˜Eu in the ﬁgure, then (2b) yields Π̂E(c˜Eu , cIu) > Π̂E(c˜Eu , c˜Eu ), and w˜∗ is
the critical input price at which (MoB) is an equality. Any input price above this critical value will induce
an eﬃcient Make-or-Buy decision in this case. Note, however, that the position of the critical input price
depends on the position of cEu relative to cIu and on the slope φ′, which in turn depends on the demands.
Figure 1. Input Prices and Eﬃcient Make-or-Buy Decisions.
Note also that the entrant’s participation decision can be aﬀected by the value of w whenever φ′ = 0. In
particular, if φ′ < 0 then an increase in the input price above marginal cost can cause the entrant to either
stay out of the market or enter but choose to make the input despite having an upstream cost disadvantage.
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V. An Example
A simple example provides a sense of how much the input price can deviate from marginal cost while still
ensuring eﬃcient Make-or-Buy decisions.21
Suppose demands are linear and symmetric as in Vives (1984, p. 75):
Qi = α˜− βpi + γpj for i, j = I, E (i = j). (5)
Assumption GS is β > γ > 0 and the displacement ratio is δ = γβ .
Suppose further that downstream costs are symmetric and constant returns, and suppress the constant
downstream marginal cost henceforth by assuming it is incorporated into α˜.
Then it is straightforward to calculate the interior equilibrium prices22
pˆI =
[2 + δ]α+ 2cIu + δc
E
u + 2δ[w− cIu]
4− δ2 (6-I)
pˆE =
[2 + δ]α+ δcIu + 2c
E
u + δ
2[w− cIu]
4− δ2 , (6-E)
where α = α˜
β
.
Substituting these equilibrium prices into (Π-E) and simplifying yields
Π̂E(cEu , w) =
β
[4− δ2]2
[
[2 + δ]α+ δcIu − [2− δ2]cEu + δ2[w − cIu]
]2
. (Π-E’)
Evaluating this equilibrium proﬁt at (cEu , c
I
u) and (w,w) reveals that (MoB) is
w
cIu
>
2θ − δ2[1 + θ]
2[1− δ2] , (MoB’)
where θ = c
E
u
cIu
is the relative productive eﬃciency of the incumbent. (MoB’) expresses a lower bound on
the percent markup of input price over the incumbent’s marginal cost in terms of the incumbent’s relative
eﬃciency and the demand displacement ratio. Markups above this bound will induce a Make decision by
the entrant and markups below this bound will induce a Buy decision by the entrant.
Table 1 provides a few values for the bound when the incumbent is relatively eﬃcient, in which case the
bound is a maximum markup for an eﬃcient Make-or-Buy decision. The boundss in Table 1 switch signs
21I am grateful to David Sappington for suggesting this analysis.
22A suﬃciently large value of the (net of downstream cost) demand intercept α˜ ensures an interior equilibrium for all values
of the other parameters considered herein.
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for values of θ less than one (i.e., a relatively ineﬃcient incumbent), in which case the bounds are minimum
markups for eﬃcient Make-or-Buy decisions. Table 1 reveals that eﬃcient Make-or-Buy decisions may occur
even when the input price markup is large (as high as 15.66%) and the incumbent’s eﬃciency advantage is
small (i.e., 5%), provided the displacement ratio is close to one. A displacement ratio close to 1 corresponds
to a relatively ﬂat φ function in Figure 1 (i.e., φ′ close to zero).
θ
1.01 1.025 1.05 1.10 1.15 1.20
0.1| 1.01% 2.51% 5.03% 10.05% 15.08% 20.10%
0.2| 1.05% 2.62% 5.25% 10.49% 15.74% 20.99%
0.4| 1.10% 2.74% 5.48% 10.95% 16.43% 21.90%
δ 0.5| 1.17% 2.92% 5.83% 11.67% 17.50% 23.33%
0.6| 1.28% 3.20% 6.41% 12.81% 19.22% 25.63%
0.7| 1.48% 3.70% 7.40% 14.80% 22.21% 29.61%
0.8| 1.89% 4.72% 9.44% 18.89% 28.33% 37.78%
0.9| 3.13% 7.83% 15.66% 31.32% 46.97% 62.63%
Table 1. Maximum Input Price Markups for Eﬃcient Make-or-Buy Decisions.
VI. Conclusion
Pricing of critical inputs is an important and complicated issue in regulated, and even some unregulated,
industries. The general problem involves many competing objectives; including the need to cover ﬁxed costs
across a bundle of services and the resulting Ramsey rules or eﬃcient component rules; provision of incentives
for innovation and cost-savings; control of potential non-price discrimination; coverage of stranded costs and,
more generally, ensuring regulatory commitment; optimal use of asymmetric information; and optimal control
of the signiﬁcantly diﬀerent strategic environment associated with two-way rather than one-way access.
This paper provides a deﬁnitive answer to the long-standing question of what input pricing regimes will
induce eﬃcient Make-or-Buy decisions by entrants, in a simpliﬁed environment in which many of these
issues do not arise, but that improves upon the existing bypass literature by considering general retail price
competition inﬂuenced by the Make-or-Buy decision. We ﬁnd that input prices are irrelevant for Make-or-
Buy decisions only when demands satisfy a restrictive and diﬃcult-to-verify assumption. Otherwise, there
is latitude in setting input prices that ensure eﬃcient Make-or-Buy decisions, but the extent of that latitude
depends on demand and cost information that is rarely available in practice. There can be considerable
latitude for even modest diﬀerences in productive eﬃciency, however, when products are nearly homogeneous.
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On the other hand, marginal cost pricing of inputs always ensures eﬃcient Make-or-Buy decisions when there
is constant returns upstream and simultaneous noncooperative price competition downstream.
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